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In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act Johanna R. Shargel Because of gender-based violence, American women and girls are relegated to a form of second-class citizenship.... When half of our citizens are not safe at home or on the streets because of their sex, our entire society is diminished.
-Sally Goldfarb, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund'
Violence currently poses the most significant threat to women's rights as equal citizens. The Senate Judiciary Committee, after reviewing a wide array of studies on violence against women in the United States, reported that " [v] iolence is the leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to 44, more common than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined." 2 Violence against women occurs with disturbing frequency and results in severe, often fatal, injuries. A recent Department of Justice survey reported that, in total, women aged twelve and older annually sustain almost five million violent victimizations; 3 approximately five hundred thousand of these victimizations are rapes and sexual assaults. 4 . According to the Nauonal Cnmc Victimization Survey (NCVS), "violent victimizations" include homicide, rape/sexual assault. robber). aggravated assault, and simple assault. See id.
4. See id. Note that the 1995 NCVS implemented significant methodological changes pursuant to an extensive 10-year redesign project aimed at producing more accurate reporting of incidents of rape and sexual assault. See id. at 1. comprehensive national study, found that one out of every eight adult women has been the victim of forcible rape at some point in her lifetime. 6 Until recently, women victimized by the reality or threat of violence were left without an effective remedy, and therefore denied their right to full and equal citizenship. First, the disabling physical and psychological effects of violence have kept women from participating as commercial actors, and their absence from the nation's marketplace has had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Women have, in Goldfarb's words, been "relegated to a form of second-class citizenship" because violence has prevented them from contributing to the national economy on an equal footing with men. 7 Women have also been "relegated to a form of second-class citizenship" because state criminal justice systems have frequently denied female victims of violence their right to equal protection of the laws. 8 Because both the restrictive letter and the biased implementation of state laws have failed to keep women "safe at home or on the streets," women continually have been deprived of their full citizenship rights.
NATIONAL VIcnm CENTER & CRIME VIcTIMS R.ESFAR(H AND
In September 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 9 drafted in response to what its chief legislative sponsor, Senator Joseph R. Biden, called a "national tragedy."' 0 The law evolved gradually over a four-year period during which Congress heard testimony from women's rights and civil rights organizations, state attorneys general, law professors, law enforcement officials, physicians, and victims of violence. What emerged from this expert testimony is a comprehensive statute containing a wide range of provisions designed to address the pressing problem of violence against women.
For example, to improve overall safety for women, the VAWA increases penalties for federal rape convictions and provides state grants to support law enforcement and educational efforts aimed at reducing violent crime against women." With respect to domestic violence, the Act criminalizes interstate domestic violence, 12 and ensures that a protective order issued in one state is given "full faith and credit" in all other states. 3 In an effort to achieve equal justice for women in the courts, the Act authorizes grants to improve the training of judges who deal with issues involving domestic violence and also encourages circuit judicial councils to conduct gender bias studies. 4 the constitutional validity of the statute, ruling in opposite directions. In Doe v. Doe, 19 a Connecticut district court upheld the Remedy, concluding that it constitutes a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 20 Only one month later, in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University, 2 ' a Virginia district court invalidated the VAWA civil rights law, holding that the enactment exceeds Congress's authority under both the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 This Note defends the constitutionality of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, which is currently mired in controversy and doctrinal confusion. Part I examines the Commerce Clause ground of the Remedy, focusing on United States v. Lopez,' a postenactment Supreme Court decision that, in another context, narrowed Congress's commerce power, thereby raising questions about the constitutional legitimacy of the VAWA Remedy. Part II analyzes the Section Five basis for the Remedy, arguing against claims that the statute fails to meet the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement. Although the constitutional attacks on the VAWA civil rights law are formidable, particularly with respect to the Commerce Clause, this Note concludes that the case law interpreting both constitutional provisions largely supports the Remedy's legitimacy on both interstate commerce and equal protection grounds.
I. SURVIVING LOPEZ: THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT OF GENDER-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE
In 1994, when the Violence Against Women Act was passed, the Commerce Clause appeared to be a sound basis for congressional action. 24 The Supreme Court had not invalidated legislation relying on the Commerce Clause in nearly sixty years,2 5 and case law consistently granted tremendous deference to congressional regulations designed to protect interstate commerce. 26 In 1995, however, the Lopez Court struck down a statute with a tenuous connection to interstate commerce, thereby redefining the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 27 Cautioning that Congress would no longer have free rein in the commerce arena, the Lopez Court ruled that unless the legislation pertained to the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, Congress would only be permitted to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. " -In addition, the Lopez Court frowned on the regulation of intrastate activity that lacks a concrete tie to interstate commerce; it also viewed with disapproval legislation that targets noncommercial activity. Lopez, however, is a deeply ambiguous opinion that has generated a considerable amount of doctrinal uncertainty both in lower courts and among academic commentators. This Part analyzes the impact of Lopez on Commerce Clause jurisprudence in general and on the constitutionality of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy in particular. It concludes that although Lopez poses a number of troubling questions and casts some doubt on Congress's authority to enact the VAWA Remedy, the Remedy will most likely survive Lopez. -9 The first Section of this Part examines the damaging effect of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce. The second Section analyzes the Lopez decision and its impact on the otherwise uniformly deferential Commerce Clause case law of the modern era and concludes that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy remains well-grounded in the Commerce Clause.
A. Violence Against Women: A Well-Documented and Substantial Threat to
Interstate Commerce
Voluminous testimony at the congressional hearings on the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy evidenced the tremendous strain that violence against women imposes on the nation's productive capacity, clearly demonstrating that gendermotivated violence has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As the Senate Judiciary Committee summarized: "'Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes restrict movement, reduce employment opportunities, increase health expenditures, and reduce consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national economy." 3 0 Extensive congressional findings and other studies demonstrate that gender-motivated violence has a detrimental effect on interstate commerce.
First, gender-motivated violence severely limits women's contribution to the national economy. Over thirty years ago, when enacting Title VII of the 28. The Lopez Court promulgated this standard as a clarification of its earlier case law, which, by its own admission, "ha [d] 
1997]
[Vol. 106: 1849 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress sought to guarantee equal opportunity for women in employment. 3 ' Gender-motivated violence, however, defeats the purpose and benefit of Title VII; it physically prevents millions of American women from full participation in commercial activity. Domestic violence in particular significantly impairs job performance: Victims of domestic violence are often harassed by their batterers at work, prevented from arriving to work on time, and kept from attending work altogether because of serious injuries. 3 2 Moreover, the threat of violence affects women's employment decisions and conduct to a large extent: Fear of violence deters women from applying for or accepting job positions in unsafe neighborhoods, and it discourages women from working after dark or on weekends. 33 The fear and threat of violence affect every American woman and therefore have both an inevitable and an enormous impact on interstate commerce.
Gender-motivated violence not only deprives women of employment opportunities, but also has a significant effect on business nationwide. At the VAWA congressional hearings, experts on abuse and legal scholars described how gender-motivated violence depletes the nation's workforce. As New York University law professor Burt Neuborne explained:
In pure economic terms, the sheer loss of productivity attributable to violent gender-based assault is staggering .... The dislocation of the nation's labor force that is caused by fear of violent gender-based 31. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994). Title VII, like the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, was based on Congress's Commerce Clause power, recognizing that bias in the workplace creates a massive drain on the nation's productive capacity. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (statement of Rep. Humphrey). Because gender-motivated violence has a comparable impact on the national economy, the Civil Rights Remedy should be sustained by the same logic. See Crimes of Violence, supra note 1, at 43 (statement of Burt Neubome, Professor of Law, New York University) (analogizing Civil Rights Remedy to Title VII and maintaining that Remedy is "equally supported by a need to eradicate the destructive effects of gender bias from our economic system"); Nourse, supra note 15, at 6 ("Would a law guaranteeing equal pay mean much to a woman whose husband beat her when she left the house? ... Violence against women . . . could wipe out in a single blow any and every advance in opportunity created by over twenty years of law reform."). Note, however, that it can be argued that Lopez drew a line between statutes like Title VII, which directly regulate employment or economic activity, and statutes like the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, which regulate noncommercial conduct that affects interstate commerce. According to this broad reading of Lopez, regulation of noncommercial, intrastate activity would be constitutionally impermissible. See infra Section I.B. 58 (1988) (finding that one-quarter of battered women surveyed had lost job due at least in part to effects of domestic violence, and over half were harassed by their abusers at work); Connie Stanley, Domestic Violence: An Occupational Impact Study 17 (July 27, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal) (finding that over 70% of employed battered women are subject to telephone harassment at work by their abusers; over 60% are late to work because of their abuser-, over 50% miss work because of abuse; and 70% have difficulty performing their job because of their abusive situation). assault is enormous: women who do not enter or who leave the labor force because of fear; women whose choice of job is dictated by fear; women whose performance on the job is affected by fear. 4 Due to the prevalence of violence against women, employers across the country must contend with lost productivity, increased health-care and security costs, and higher turnover. 35 In addition to decreasing nationwide production, violence against women also has a negative effect on levels of commercial consumption. As one witness explained at the VAWA congressional hearings:
See Violence
Women who cannot traverse public streets without fear will also not use places of public accommodation, purchase goods, or conduct business in such areas. Fear of gender-motivated violence restricts the hours during which women can engage in a variety of activities and seriously curtails their participation in the commerce of our nation.'
Whether analyzing the economic loss precipitated by gender-motivated violence from the perspective of supply or demand, the conclusion is the same: Gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce because women as a group constitute approximately half the nation's consumers and producers. The fact that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is rooted in the Commerce Clause rightly acknowledges that when half the citizens of this country-half the commercial actors-either fear or are subject to incapacitation by violence because of their gender, the entire nation suffers.
B. United States v. Lopez: An Uncertain Legacy
As described in the previous Section, there is more than adequate data demonstrating the significant costs of violence against women to support the claim that gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce. Turning to the relevant body of case law, the question becomes whether the nexus between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce is sufficiently close to meet the standards established in United States v. Lopez, 37 the Supreme Court's most recent and most restrictive formulation of Congress's Commerce Clause power. In Lopez, the Court departed significantly from its traditional approach to legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause, suggesting that Congress's commerce power is constrained by certain limiting principles. Lopez, however, is an ambiguous case that raised more questions than it answered. Since Lopez was decided, lower courts and academic commentators have grappled with the issues presented by the decision, and have reached contradictory conclusions. The doctrinal uncertainty generated by Lopez is demonstrated by the fact that the two district courts that have reviewed the constitutionality of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy after Lopez have ruled in opposite directions. 38 Although the Lopez Court offered certain indications that it would regard specific types of congressional regulation with less favor, it did not establish a rigid standard or bright-line test for evaluating the validity of commerce legislation. 39 Ultimately, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy would fail only under the most expansive reading of Lopez, a reading that does not seem to be the most plausible or defensible construction of the case.
Lopez invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, an act that made possession of a firearm in a school zone a federal offense. 40 The Court held that the statute exceeded Congress's commerce power because the possession of firearms in school zones does not qualify as economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. 4 ' After reviewing the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in some detail, the Lopez Court identified three broad categories of activity that Congress is permitted to regulate under its commerce authority: first, "the use of the channels of interstate commerce"; second, "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce"; and third, "those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 4 2 With respect to the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Court "quickly disposed" of the first two categories and focused its attention on the third, finding that the possession of guns in local school zones does not "substantially affect[] interstate commerce." 43 Recognizing that prior Commerce Clause cases had granted "great deference to congressional action," Lopez left two significant questions in its wake: whether legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause requires a jurisdictional element and whether such legislation is restricted to the regulation of economic or commercial activity. If future Supreme Court opinions resolve these questions in accordance with the broadest possible reading of Lopez, the result could be fatal to the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. The text of the Lopez opinion itself, as well as its interpretation by lower courts and legal academics, however, favor a more moderate reading of Lopez---one that would leave the VAWA Remedy unscathed.
The Jurisdictional Element
With respect to the first open-ended and potentially damaging issue, the necessity of a jurisdictional element, the Lopez Court was troubled by the fact that the Gun-Free School Zones Act had "no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.' ' 
46
The specific facts of Lopez show the marked absence of a concrete tie to interstate commerce: "Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce . . . "4 In reviewing the VAWA Remedy after Lopez, the Court might similarly conclude that gender-motivated violence is principally local conduct that lacks a cognizable tie to interstate commerce. At bottom, the Civil Rights Remedy, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, does not contain a jurisdictional element ensuring on a case-by-case basis that each alleged violation of the Remedy affects interstate commerce. Prior to Lopez, the concept of a jurisdictional element did not present itself in Commerce Clause case law. Over the past sixty years, in a series of highly deferential decisions, the Court allowed Congress free rein to regulate purely intrastate activity as long as that activity had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce when considered in the aggregate. 59 Although Lopez, with its explicit reference to a jurisdictional element, appears to have introduced a more stringent standard for determining whether the activity at issue has an adequate interstate nexus, the Court also specifically noted that its decision would preserve Commerce Clause precedent in its entirety. The final passage in Lopez clearly states that the Court simply declined "to proceed any further" down the road toward granting Congress "general police power. ' 6
"
The Lopez Court therefore expressed only an intent to limit the expansion of congressional commerce power, not an intent to retract authority granted to Congress in previous cases. Because the Lopez opinion claims to be in harmony with a long lineage of deferential Commerce Clause cases, it is these cases that must be brought to bear in interpreting Lopez and in determining the extent to which a jurisdictional element or interstate nexus will be required of legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause. 
. ).
60. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (citation omitted): see also id. at 1636-37 (Kennedy. J.. concurrng) (concluding, after reviewing history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. that major precedents -are not called in question by our decision today"). Even Justice Thomas. whose concurring opinion rued the "wrong turn" the Court took in the 1930s, conceded that many believe "it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare dectiss and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean." Id. at 1650 n.8 (Thomas. J., concumng). It is also w'orth noting that a Seventh Circuit post-Lopez decision upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act against a Lopez challenge concluded that, "the Supreme Court reaffirmed, rather than overturned. the previous half century of Commerce 62 On its face, the Act regulated purely intrastate activity; its aim was to protect the rights of employees to unionize. Nevertheless, the Court found that the local manufacturing operations of the Pennsylvania steel company at issue, a company that received raw materials from other states and shipped finished products interstate, had "such a close and intimate relation to interstate commerce as to make the presence of industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national concern. 63 Extending exceptionally broad power to Congress, the Court explained that the commerce authority "is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce." 64 According to the Jones & Laughlin Steel Court, Congress is free to regulate an intrastate activity outside the regular flow of interstate commerce as long as the activity has a "close and substantial relation" to interstate commerce, and its regulation is necessary to protect interstate commerce against "burdens and obstructions." 65 In cases following Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court continued to blur the distinction between interstate and intrastate activity, granting ever-increasing power to Congress to regulate intrastate activity. In United States v. Darby, 66 for example, the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, an act prohibiting the interstate shipment of commodities produced under labor conditions that violate certain federal standards. A unanimous Court held that Congress is permitted to regulate local labor conditions, a purely intrastate subject, so long as the finished product would ultimately be sold interstate. 67 The Court further held that even where only a portion of goods produced is intended for interstate commerce, Congress may still regulate the entire industry because products intended for interstate commerce are, in practice, inseparable from products intended for intrastate commerce. Like the Jones & Laughlin Steel Court before it, the Darby Court rendered the line between interstate and intrastate activity virtually indistinct, approving federal regulation of intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce in a broad sense.
In 69 an act that imposed quotas on wheat to increase its market price. The plaintiff in Wickard was an Ohio farmer who operated a small dairy farm that produced wheat solely for consumption on the farm itself. 70 According to the Wickard plaintiff, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as applied in his case, exceeded Congress's commerce power because it regulated activities "local in character" that had only an "indirect" effect on interstate commerce. 7 ' Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Jackson rejected the plaintiff's challenge to the Act, reasoning that the fact that the plaintiff's "own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.
72 While the Darby Court had held that Congress could control intrastate activity where it is "inseparable" from interstate activity, the Wickard Court took Congress's power one step further and held that Congress could regulate purely intrastate activity-here, a farmer's consumption of his own homegrown wheat-because that activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce when considered in the aggregate.
3
Looking to the permissive holdings of Jones & Laughlin Steel and its progeny, which indicated that the Court was prepared to accord Congress substantial freedom to regulate intrastate activity, Congress decided to rely on the Commerce Clause as the constitutional basis for Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title II prohibits racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, and Congress maintained that such discrimination threatens and substantially affects interstate commerce. 74 When Title II was being considered by Congress, several senators charged that if the law were enacted, the Commerce Clause would be distorted beyond any recognizable limit; they argued that the federal government should not involve itself in the regulation of activities that are primarily intrastate in nature. Senator Monroney of Oklahoma, for example, found it "rather difficult to stretch the clause to cover an eating place simply because some of the meat moves from one state into another; or because the vegetables they serve come from Florida, or the oranges come from California." 75 
73.
The Lopez Court clearly adopted MWckard's "in the aggregate" reasoning as part and parcel of its "substantial effects" test. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624. 1634 (1995) ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elfsenhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.") (emphasis added).
74. Title II provides: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods. services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race. color, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994 Heart of Atlanta Motel held that a motel cannot refuse to lodge blacks on the basis of race and established that however local the motel's operations might seem, "discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel. 78 In upholding Title H of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Heart of Atlanta Motel Court set forth a highly deferential standard to determine whether legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause is constitutionally sound. The proper twopart test, the Court explained, is "(1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it congressmen and legal scholars protested at the time that Title II should be based on the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Commerce Clause. For example, Professor Gerald Gunther wrote:
The aim of the proposed anti-discrimination legislation, I take it, is quite unrelated to any concern with national commerce in any substantive sense. It would, I think, pervert the meaning and purpose of the commerce clause to invoke it as the basis for this legislation.... [I] would much prefer to see the Government channel its resources of ingenuity and advocacy into the development of a viable interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the provision with a natural linkage to the race problem. That would seem to me a considerably less demeaning task than the construction of an artificial commerce facade .... Id. at 149 (quoting Letter from Gerald Gunther, Law Professor, Stanford University, to the Department of Justice (June 5, 1963)). Ultimately, Congress relied exclusively on the Commerce Clause, reasoning that to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment would create unnecessary risks. As Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy explained: ."inhere is an injustice that needs to be remedied. We have to find the tools with which to remedy that injustice." ' Id. It is important to recognize, however, that Congress determined that reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment would invite constitutional challenges to Title II two years before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1964), the most significant and expansive Section Five case of the modem era, had been decided. See infra text accompanying notes 152-54.
Echoing the debate over Title II, the argument has been made that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is fundamentally about securing women's equal protection under the laws, and is "unrelated to any concern with national commerce in any substantive sense." See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: A Legislative History of the Violence Against Women's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 22 (1996) ("There is no question, of course, that Congress was aiming at discriminatory violence rather than the commerce itself."). Although this position has some merit, this Note grants both constitutional bases of the Remedy equal attention and respect because in relying on the Commerce Clause, Congress took the important step of acknowledging and underscoring the effects of gender-motivated violence on the public, commercial realm. With the VAWA Remedy in existence, gendermotivated violence can no longer be viewed as a private, hidden issue that state justice systems, see infra Section II.A, and even other civil rights laws, see infra text accompanying notes 176-79, have failed to address; the Remedy recharacterizes violence against women as a problem that negatively affects the most public of all spaces, the commercial marketplace, because women are essential to its operation, Therefore, the VAWA Remedy's Commerce Clause basis is not simply a constitutional hook on which to hang the legislation, but a significant statement about women's status and importance as commercial actors and citizens.
76 had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate. 79 The Court applied the "rational basis" test again in McClung, which also involved a challenge to Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The defendant owned and operated a family restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, and refused to serve black patrons in the dining area. After reviewing the legislative history of Title II, the Court again deferred to Congress's determination that the legislation was a rational means of protecting interstate commerce8W As applied to Ollie's Barbecue, the Court concluded that Congress could reasonably have found that "established restaurants ... sold less interstate goods because of the discrimination, that interstate travel was obstructed directly by it, that business in general suffered and that many new businesses refrained from establishing there as a result." 8 As in Wickard and preceding cases, the Court in both Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung was undeterred by the fact that the commercial establishments at issue in those cases served intrastate as well as interstate customers. The critical factor in both decisions was that the aggregate impact of the alleged racial discrimination substantially affected interstate commerce.
Commerce Clause jurisprudence before Lopez, from Jones & Laughlin Steel to McClung, uniformly established that Congress is free to regulate intrastate activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce when considered in the aggregate. Since these cases were not overruled by Lopez, the decisions lend support to the position that an actual jurisdictional element is not a prerequisite for the legitimate exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. Against the background of these cases, it is likely that Lopez does not mandate a jurisdictional element as a new requirement for Congress to follow. The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, therefore, most likely will not be invalidated because of the absence of a jurisdictional tie. Because Congress demonstrated that gender-motivated violence has a substantial impact on interstate commerce when considered in the aggregate, 2 there is a sufficient interstate nexus even by Lopez standards. Lopez stands for the proposition that noneconomic intrastate activity-including activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce--cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy will certainly be invalidated. The question of whether a regulated activity must be commercial in nature is more difficult to resolve than the necessity of a jurisdictional element because even the deferential (and still operative) Commerce Clause case law discussed above involves statutes that directly regulate commercial activity. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act regulates business establishments, 3 and the Jones & Laughlin Steel line of cases deal with statutes that pertain to economic matters such as manufacturing operations, labor conditions, and wheat production and consumption. 4 Therefore, although these cases are relevant after Lopez, they do not help answer the second troubling question raised by Lopez: Can a noneconomic intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, such as gendermotivated violence, be regulated under the Commerce Clause?
The Regulation of Cormnercial Activity
The Lopez opinion seemed in large part to be driven by the fact that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not directly involve economic activity, and therefore the Act could not be upheld as a "regulation[] of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. ' openly admitted that "a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty." 88 The weight of the evidence, however, points to the conclusion that after Lopez, Congress is still free to regulate noncommercial activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The large majority of legal academics considering the question has adopted this moderate reading of Lopez, maintaining that Lopez did not draw a bright line between the regulation of economic and noneconomic activity. 8 9 Furthermore, lower courts following Lopez have taken this less strict approach, approving the regulation of noncommercial activities that, in the words of the Lopez majority, "arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction." 9 Several federal appellate courts, for example, have upheld the federal arson statute against claims that it does not survive Lopez, reasoning that although the statute "does not regulate commercial or economic activity, it does regulate the damage or destruction of business property that satisfies the requisite interstate nexus." 9 ' Like arson, gender-motivated violence, though only indirectly linked to commerce, has a substantial effect on economic activity. After all, when women are assaulted in their homes, or when their work choices are activities that substantially affect interstate commerce").
88 Although the federal arson statute has been upheld by lower courts after Lopez despite the fact that it regulates noncommercial activity, it is important to note that the statute does contain a junsdictional element that ensures an interstate nexus. The statute provides: "Whoer maliciously damages or destroys ... any ... property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than five years and not more than twenty years. fined under this title, or both .... 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
constrained by fear for their own safety, there is a tangible effect on the operations of the national economy. 92 Not only is it evident that the VAWA Remedy is analogous to the federal arson statute, which has been upheld by lower courts after Lopez, but also it can be argued that the economic effect of gender-motivated violence is more direct, immediate, and substantial 93 than the economic impact of permitting guns in school zones. The VAWA Remedy, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, would not require that the Court "pile inference upon inference" ' 94 in order to find a substantial link to interstate commerce. In Lopez, the Government maintained in its brief that "the presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to the educational process by threatening the learning environment. A handicapped educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive citizenry." 95 This reasoning entails several levels of conjecture and hypothesis: The possession of firearms in schools may cripple the educational process; a "handicapped educational process" may result in a "less productive citizenry"; and finally, a "less productive citizenry" may have "an adverse effect on the Nation's economic well-being." 96 Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which regulates activity that might lead to violent crime, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy targets violent crime, gender-motivated violence, directly. Moreover, gender-motivated violence has a necessary and substantial, not a tenuous or speculative, connection to interstate commerce. Gendermotivated violence directly prevents women from participating in the workforce; it has an immediate and measurable effect on national productivity. 97 Even the Brzonkala court, while striking down the Civil Rights Remedy on Commerce Clause grounds, conceded that "the case at hand possibly involves one less step than the postulated effects in Lopez." 98 
The Gun-Free School Zones Act Distinguished
Whether or not the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy survives Lopez depends in large part on how the jurisdictional element requirement is construed, and on how the commercial/noncommercial distinction plays itself out in future cases. Beyond these two central questions, however, there are several additional ways of distinguishing the VAWA Remedy from the Gun-Free School Zones Act struck down in Lopez. First, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is distinguishable from the GunFree School Zones Act because it does not invade areas of law traditionally reserved for state regulation. The Lopez Court expressed concern that if the Gun-Free School Zones Act were upheld, Congress's Commerce Clause power would be virtually unlimited, and the delicate balance between state and federal jurisdiction would be disturbed." The Court specifically identified "education," "family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody)," and "criminal law enforcement" as areas "where States historically have been sovereign."' tt° If Lopez did impose new restraints on Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, it seems likely that this restraint will manifest itself in terms of closer scrutiny of legislation involving these three targeted areas. The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, however, leaves all three traditional areas of state sovereignty untouched.' 0 ' The Remedy obviously does not involve education and cannot be considered a "family law" for two important reasons. First, its scope is not restricted to domestic relations; it regulates gender-motivated violence regardless of whether the perpetrator is related to the victim. Second, the Remedy expressly excludes "any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody decree."' ' 02 Therefore, the VAWA Remedy excepts the precise areas the Lopez Court defined as family law, namely "marriage, divorce, and child custody."' 0 3
Perhaps even more importantly, the VAWA Remedy is a civil rights law, not a criminal statute.'O° This fact is significant because the Lopez Court repeatedly and emphatically underscored the fact that "'[s]tates possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."" 05 In contrast with the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy does not interfere with states' power to govern themselves or to prescribe their own criminal laws. Underscoring the inadequacy of remedies available at the state level, the Remedy merely offers an alternative way for victims of gendermotivated violence to be compensated for their injuries. VAWA's remedy is ... a classic civil rights remedy: it does not directly punish the State that has failed to prosecute acquaintance rape cases or to arrest spouse abusers. Instead, it seeks to force courts to address the reasons "why" those practices exist by exposing the very same prejudices in the conduct subject to suit."
A "classic" civil rights law that educates and compensates in response to failures in the state system is easily distinguished from the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which coopted states' control over their own criminal laws. ' There is a second, equally significant, way to distinguish the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy from the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The Lopez majority noted its disapproval of the absence of congressional findings to support the Government's claim that the possession of guns in school zones has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained:
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here. ' consideration, "one source of potential support for the proposition that the statute had a rational connection to interstate commerce." 5 Nevertheless, although Lopez suggests that legislative findings are not profoundly influential, these findings are likely to assume greater importance in a close case, such as the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, where the activity's effect on interstate commerce is not intuitively obvious or immediately apparent. In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the significance of legislative findings in view of the fact that "no such substantial effect [on commerce] was visible to the naked eye." ' 6 In his Lopez dissent, Justice Breyer explained that congressional findings offer "the benefit of some extra leeway," which "in principle, might change the result in a close case." ' " 7 Therefore, although the presence of legislative findings accompanying the VAWA Remedy might not be a dispositive factor, and although courts will exercise independent judgment despite the existence of substantial findings, to dissenting Justice Souter, legislative findings undoubtedly "shrink[] the risk that judicial research will miss material scattered across the public domain or buried under pounds of legislative record."" 8 Finally, the VAWA Remedy can be distinguished from the Gun-Free School Zones Act on the ground that it is supported by an entirely separate constitutional basis: Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy equal protection violations at the state level. The fact that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is partially rooted in Congress's finding that state systems nationwide have often failed victims of gender-motivated violence bolsters the Commerce Clause claim that gender-motivated violence is not a local issue suitable for state jurisdiction exclusively. The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, is backed by a federal interest apart from interstate commerce: a federal interest in ensuring that victims of gender-motivated violence are afforded equal protection of the laws. The equal protection issues at stake, described in the next Part, inform and complement the Commerce Clause analysis because these unmistakably federal issues add weight to the assertion that gender-motivated violence is a problem that crosses state lines and affects the health and well-being of the entire nation. In essence, Congress's invocation of both the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause to remedy the problem of gender-motivated violence sends the same message: Women have the right to full and equal citizenship-both in terms of participation in the national economy and in terms of protection by the criminal justice system.
1I. THE VAWA CiviL RIGHTS REMEDY AS A VALID ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION
In addition to the Commerce Clause, Congress relied on Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as a constitutional basis for the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy." 9 Section Five provides that, "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 In this instance, Congress aimed to enforce Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that, "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 2 ' Congress invoked Section Five because it aimed to provide victims of gender-motivated violence with equal protection of the laws where state systems had failed. The potential assaults on Congress's authority to enact the Remedy under Section Five are considerably less threatening than the post-Lopez Commerce Clause challenges discussed above. Attacks on the Section Five basis of the Civil Rights Remedy generally maintain that the Remedy's proscription of "purely private conduct" violates the state action limit of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part argues that the VAWA Remedy falls within the judicially circumscribed limits of Section Five because Section Five is not limited by the same state action requirement as Section One. In reaching that conclusion, this Part first describes the widespread gender inequality that pervades the state criminal justice system, drawing on congressional hearings that indicate that gender-motivated violence presents equal protection problems at the state level that demand a federal remedy. The following Section then analyzes the extent and limits of Congress's power under Section Five and argues that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy fits comfortably within those limits. This Part further maintains that the Civil Rights Remedy is "appropriate legislation" within the meaning of Section Five because it is specifically tailored to combat the critical problem of violence against women, and is therefore an effective means of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause. 
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A. Inequality in the State System
Congress enacted the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy based on an extensive legislative record that documented the many ways in which state courts do not afford female crime victims equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gender bias and discrimination within the state system frequently deprive women of the protection to which they are entitled. 122 As Senator Biden described the problem on introducing the VAWA Remedy to Congress: "[I]t is still easier to convict a car thief than a rapist, and, authorities are more likely to arrest a man for parking tickets than for beating his wife . . ,,t21 This Section summarizes the statistics, reports, and testimony gathered at the VAWA congressional hearings and concludes that because of the states' failure to provide equal protection to victims of gender-motivated violence, Congress had legitimate cause for creating the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy.
Obstacles to equal treatment for female victims of violence within the state system exist at both legal and administrative levels. On a legal level, state statute books are rife with formal bars to equality. For example, some states still retain a marital exemption to laws prohibiting rape; 24 several states also heighten the legal standards for proving sexual assault against cohabitants and dating companions."' z Another legal barrier to equality is the interspousal immunity doctrine, which in some states still prevents battered women from suing their husbands to recover damages for either medical expenses or pain and suffering. A substantial number of states that have abolished the marital rape exemption, however, still treat marital rape differently from nonmarital rape. These states either impose lesser penalties on perpetrators of marital rape, compare, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-3 (1992 & Supp. 1996) (establishing that sexual assault in first degree is punishable by imprisonment of not less than 15 nor more than 35 years), with id. § 61-8B-6 (establishing that sexual assault of spouse, while still felony, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than two nor more than ten years), or create higher legal standards for proving marital rape than for proving nonmarital rape, compare, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95(l)(a) (1972 ( & Supp. 1996 (defining sexual battery as sexual penetration of another person without his or her consent), with id. § 97-3-99 (providing that spouse of alleged victim may be found guilty of sexual battery only if spouse engaged in forcible sexual penetration without consent of alleged victim). For an overview of the history of the marital rape exemption and each state's current approach to spousal rape, see Emily R. In addition to marital rape exemptions, interspousal tort immunities, and statutes of limitations, which restrict the availability of prosecution for gendermotivated crimes, there are also discriminatory laws that obstruct justice at the trial level. For example, state rape shield laws do not apply in civil cases, so that "women bringing tort actions for sexual assault are routinely subjected to intrusive questions about consensual sexual activity unrelated to the attack."'" Furthermore, most jurisdictions still adhere to the common la%% "fresh complaint rule," which creates a rebuttable presumption against the credibility of rape complaints that are not filed immediately after the alleged assault. 129 Although study after study shows that delays in reporting are to be expected because of the trauma caused by sexual assault." the fresh complaint rule is still used to identify false reports. Along similar lines, pattern jury instructions used in state courts nationwide require that juries be reminded of the ever-present possibility of false reporting.' 3 ' Even the Model Penal Code suggests that juries in sexual assault cases "be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficult)' of determining the truth [of the allegation].' ' 2 These legal barriers to equality are compounded by discriminatory administrative practices, which undermine whatever protection is provided by the letter of state law. Congressional hearings on the VAWA Remedy showed that gender bias contaminates every level of the state system, and that insensitive and unresponsive treatment by police, prosecutors, and judges often results in low reporting and conviction rates. Police, responsible for the initial screening of cases, are notorious for not responding to situations involving violence against women, particularly domestic violence. The Fund for the Feminist Majority reported at the VAWA legislative hearings that "23% of women who decline from reporting their being raped to the police do so because they thought the police would be inefficient, ineffective, or insensitive."' ' 33 An internal investigation of the Oakland, California Police Department found that ninety percent of the sexual assault reports that were determined to be unfounded in 1989 and 1990 should have been further investigated.' 34 The Oakland investigation further discovered that one out of every four women who reported a rape or attempted rape to the Oakland Police during those years was ignored.
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Equally problematic is the well-documented fact that prosecutors often fail to enforce vigorously laws prohibiting gender-motivated violence. As one commentator described: "Faced with limited time, personnel, and resources... prosecutors often give domestic violence cases low priority and sometimes even try to persuade battered women not to prosecute."' ' 36 At the congressional hearings on the Civil Rights Remedy, it was readily apparent that prosecutors across the country either refuse to charge or significantly undercharge alleged perpetrators of sex crimes:
Witnesses told of counties in which no acquaintance rape prosecutions had been brought .... They quoted from Justice Department studies showing that most domestic violence cases caused injuries as serious as most felonies and, yet, experience demonstrated that most domestic violence crimes were charged as misdemeanors. They testified about threats to witnesses routinely prosecuted in drug cases but ignored in domestic abuse cases. 13 7 In fact, a civil rights case that will be decided by the Supreme Court this Term offers a paradigmatic illustration of state prosecutors' unwillingness to bring charges in cases of alleged sexual assault. The case, United States v. Lanier,' 38 involves a Tennessee Chancery Court judge ultimately convicted in federal court of sexually assaulting five women on five separate occasions in his chambers, at times dressed in his judicial robes. One of Judge Lanier's victims was a litigant with a child custody matter before his court; the other four victims were court employees or women who worked with the judge in his official capacity. But because Judge Lanier's brother was the county prosecutor, and because his family had "occupied positions of power and political authority in Dyersburg, Dyer County, Tennessee, for several generations ,' 39 it is doubtful that his criminal conduct would ever have been prosecuted in state court. 40 In the end, Judge Lanier's sexual assaults were only exposed and federally prosecuted because of an unrelated federal investigation into suspected political corruption involving Judge Lanier and his brother.' 4 ' The facts of the Lanier case vividly support the claim that because of local affiliations and prejudices, state prosecutors often fail to enforce criminal protections against gender-based violence.
Gender bias exists among state court judges as well. For example, the Washington State Task Force on Gender and Justice in the Courts reported that nearly one "quarter of the [state judges] believed that rape victims 'sometimes' or 'frequently' precipitate their sexual assaults because of what they wear and/or actions preceding the incidents."' 4 2 One state court judge told a domestic violence victim seeking protection in his court, "'Let's kiss and make up and get out of my court.""1 4 ' The New York State Task Force found that some judges "shunt victims back and forth between police and family court until they give up seeking protection."'"
B. The Reach of Congress's Enforcement Power
In the face of this evidence demonstrating that state justice systems discriminate against female victims of violence at every level, some remain convinced that state courts afford victims of gender-motivated violence equal protection of the laws. For example, one law professor has argued that because violence against women "is already adequately covered by state law," the VAWA Remedy is a "wasteful duplication of resources."' 4 5 Most critics, however, do not contest the extensive findings of widespread bias in the state court system,'-6 but instead argue that as an antidote to this inequity, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy exceeds Congress's power under Section Five 139. Id. at 1394 (Wellford, J., concumng in part and dissenting in pan). 294 (1964) . See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Also note that in determining whether a rational basis existed for Congress's enactment, the McClung Court was persuaded by the fact that there was a "voluminous legislative history" supporting the enactment. See 379 U.S. at 309. As described in Section II.A, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy also has a "voluminous legislative history" demonstrating that Congress had a rational basis supporting this effort to enforce equal protection. .. and the extent to which courts should defer to Congress' exercise of that authority.... We need not. and do not. address these differences today.").
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The Morgan Court made clear that the only substantial restriction on Congress's Section Five authority is that enforcement legislation cannot retract or reduce Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, "Section 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment: § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute" its protecuons. 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. This limitation clearly does not pertain to the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. Congress's remedy for gendcr-motivated violence in no way aims to "restrict, abrogate. or dilute" the equal protecuon guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment-it only aims to enhance those guarantees.
156 Of course, it is important to recognize that although Congress appears free to regulate "purely private conduct," there must exist "sufficient state contacts" so that the regulation truly remedies state denials of equal protection. In the Civil Rights Cases, 168 one of the earliest Supreme Court decisions establishing the extent of Congress's power under Section Five to enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court invalidated several sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which, without "reference whatever to any supposed or apprehended violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the part of the States,"' 169 required that states provide all citizens equal accommodation and privileges at inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement. The Court struck down the statute because it had no apparent connection to state action of any kind:
[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual ... if not sanctioned in some way by the State .... 170 Because the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is rooted in state denials of equal protection, it meets the standard established in the Civil Rights Cases. Although the VAWA Remedy reaches the "wrongful acts of individuals," its legislative history demonstrates that the granting of a remedy for those 166 The inquiry as to whether Congress exceeded its Section Five powers does not end here, however. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly states that Congress has the power to enforce Section One by "appropriate legislation.' '173 The Morgan Court, following the McCulloch v. Maryland"" standard, interpreted this provision to include legislation that is "'plainly adapted' to furthering the[] aims of the Equal Protection Clause."'" As the following discussion makes clear, there is no question that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is "appropriate legislation" within the meaning given by the Morgan Court.
Several aspects of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy illustrate the fact that the statute was specifically designed to remedy equal protection problems. First, the Remedy appropriately addresses the type of violence most frequently suffered by women. It is well established that most violence against women occurs in private and is perpetrated by people known to the victim. 1 7 6 In contrast to race-based discrimination, acts of gender-motivated violence are not usually committed under color of state law' 77 or by a conspiracy of wrongdoers. 78 Because existing civil rights laws were drafted primarily to address the problem of racial discrimination, these laws do not respond in any significant way to the problem of gender-motivated violence. As Representative Patricia Schroeder explained at the VAWA legislative hearings: "Gender motivated violence cannot be adequately affected by existing civil rights structures because gender crimes manifest themselves differently than other crimes-they tend to be acts by individuals."' 7 9 Clearly, a meaningful and effective civil rights remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence must reach violence committed by individuals acting in a private capacity. Because the VAWA Remedy is the first civil rights statute to recognize what constitutes the most common and devastating threat to women's equal citizenship, it is true to its purpose of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause.
The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy also effectively remedies the problem of equal protection at the state level by simply offering an alternative, less biased forum for victims of gender-motivated violence. First, plaintiffs bringing suit in federal court do not have to contend with unjust and outmoded laws, such as the marital rape exemption and the fresh complaint rule, which still exist in a number of states. 8 0 Second, although gender discrimination undoubtedly exists in the federal system as well, there is evidence that female victims of violence have received fairer treatment in federal court.) 8 ' The very fact that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy offers a federal forum for victims of gender-motivated violence, along with the fact that the Remedy specifically addresses the most frequent and harmful kind of violence against women, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the VAWA Remedy is A] s with civil rights legislation aimed at protecting racial minorities, it is fair to assume that the federal system would provide litigants a better opportunity to assert their rights than would state courts.").
[Vol. 106: 1849 "appropriate legislation" to further the aims of the Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.
iI. CONCLUSION
Gender-motivated violence is a federal problem that warrants a federal solution. Although the constitutional bases of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy have been and are expected to be fiercely contested, Congress most likely acted within its authority under both the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because gender-motivated violence deeply affects interstate commerce, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy should survive the ambiguous threat posed by Lopez. Moreover, the VAWA Remedy is firmly supported on another constitutional ground: It is an appropriate and effective means of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause, and fits within the scope of Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
If gender-motivated violence continues unabated by a federal remedy, women will continue to be deprived of their full citizenship rights. State law as currently enforced does not provide victims of gender-motivated violence the full rights of citizenship; victims are frequently denied equal protection of the laws by many state criminal justice systems. Moreover, unassisted victims of violence cannot participate on an equal basis in the national economy; their contribution to interstate commerce decreases and consequently, in Sally Goldfarb's words, "our entire society is diminished."' 8 -As two parts of the same equation, the Commerce Clause and Section Five bases of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy are both necessary and appropriate means of achieving full and equal citizenship.
182. See Crimes of Violence, supra note 1, at 8.
